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Abstract 
 
Background: It is now over half a century since community care was introduced in the wake 
of the closure of the old asylum system. This paper considers whether mental health services, 
regardless of location, can be genuinely effective and humane without a fundamental 
paradigm shift.  
Data: A summary of research on the validity and effectiveness of current mental health 
treatment approaches is presented. 
Limitations: The scope of the topic was too broad to facilitate a systematic review or meta-
analyses, although reviews with more narrow foci are cited. 
Conclusions: The move to community care failed to facilitate a more psychosocial, recovery-
focused approach, instead exporting the medical model and its technologies, often 
accompanied by coercion, into a far broader domain than the hospital. There are, however, 
some encouraging signs that the long overdue paradigm shift may be getting closer. 
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Improving Community Mental Health Services: The Need for a Paradigm Shift 
 
Western psychiatry is increasingly reported to be in a state of crisis,1 with challenges that 
include a poor reputation among other medical disciplines,2 a perceived lack of scientific 
status,3 diminishing confidence in the reliability and validity of diagnostic classifications,4 
and growing concerns around the safety and effectiveness of psychiatric medications.5 In this 
respect, a systematic review of 503 studies examining perceptions of psychiatry, 
psychiatrists, and psychiatric treatments and institutions found pervasive negative attitudes 
amongst the general public, medical students, the media, other healthcare professionals, and 
patients and family members.6 Indeed, the 2008-2011 Action Plan of the World Psychiatric 
Association was obliged to incorporate specific goals for enhancing the discipline’s image.7  
What factors might contribute to making psychiatric healthcare so uniquely critiqued 
and polarizing compared to other medical disciplines? This article considers a specific aspect 
of provision – community care (CC) –  and examines the influence of current paradigms in 
creating and maintaining these kinds of discontent. We suggest that fundamental changes are 
required in order to develop evidence-based services that are capable of responding to 
patients’ needs in humane and effective ways, and outline examples of approaches that are 
equipped to institute the necessary paradigm shift in both academic theory and therapeutic 
practice. 
 
A Brief History of Community Care 
 
Community care usually refers to the delivery of specialist support and treatment in 
domiciliary settings, and is primarily organized via services like outpatient clinics, supported 
housing, day services, and the assignment of community psychiatric nurses and social 
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workers. In western countries, the shift from institutional to CC occurred with the widespread 
closure of the asylums in the 1950s and 60s, and represented one of the most substantial 
policy changes in the history of mental health services. The main rationales offered for CC at 
the time, and since, were increasing access to better care; improving social integration; and 
eradicating the institutionalization, abuse and neglect that characterized many of the old-
fashioned hospitals. Others have pointed out, however, that a major impetus was simply to 
save money.8 
While deinstituionalizaton appeared to present a new and less pessimistic approach, 
what occurred in reality was the exporting of the same ‘medical model’ rationale that 
underscored the old hospitals.  What was not exported was a sufficient proportion of the 
money that had been spent for decades on the asylum approach to care. The World Health 
Organization9 reports that CC expansion did not kept pace with asylum closures in many 
countries, leaving a ‘service vacuum’ wherein significant numbers of patients receive 
inadequate support. In the UK, for example, a review by the Care Quality Commission10 
identified numerous critical failings, including breaching of patient rights, and substandard 
inpatient, crisis, and out-of-hours care. Furthermore, while CC was originally presented as 
synonymous with an increase in patients’ civil rights, numerous countries have introduced 
increased legislation for granting powers of coercive medical treatment outside the hospital. 
For example, supervised compulsory treatment orders (CTOs) are commonly used to enforce 
medication adherence in one’s own home, despite their ethical implications and inconsistent 
evidence of benefit (e.g., impact on medication compliance, number and duration of hospital 
admissions, and quality of life11). Although these compulsory powers were partly prompted 
in response to a small number of high-profile assaults perpetrated by psychiatric patients, 
concerns have been expressed that authoritarian, coercive treatment models (whether 
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administered chemically via medication or physically via enforced hospital committal), may 
actually increase risk through reducing patients’ incentive to engage with services.12  
The perceived failings and inadequacies of CC have provoked significant levels of 
debate in the past 50 years.13 On one hand, this dialogue can be framed in practical and 
procedural terms: e.g., how services are commissioned, organized, and delivered.  However, 
the focus of this article is on an alternative aspect: the ideological basis on which CC operates 
and, crucially, what changes we believe are necessary to drive the shift towards more humane 
and effective mental health services. 
The Need for a Paradigm Shift 
It is our contention that the biomedical underpinnings on which CC is based has resulted in a 
general exporting of the asylum mindset –  the confinement and control of supposed 
biological diseases – into community settings. We would further suggest that a major 
difficulty with contemporary models of CC is that they are premised within what has been 
deemed ‘a technological paradigm’14 or what the psychologist Lucy Johnstone15 characterizes 
as “patients with illnesses” as opposed to “people with problems.” Here we reiterate the work 
of Bracken et al.,14,p.430 who outline the assumptions of this paradigm as it applies to 
psychiatry in the following terms: 
 
1. Mental health problems arise from faulty mechanisms or processes of some sort, 
involving abnormal physiological or psychological events occurring within the 
individual. 
2. These mechanisms or processes can be modelled in causal terms. They are not 
context dependent. 
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3. Technological interventions are instrumental and can be designed and studied 
independently of relationships and values. 
 
While critics of this framework do not deny that some patients find it beneficial, a 
major assertion is that other ways exist of conceptualizing distress (specifically, as a response 
to life events rather than a biogenetic disease); that these are scientifically and morally 
justified; and that for many can be a turning point in the recovery journey. In the following 
sections, we outline some of the major limitations with the technological paradigm’s 
hypotheses (for further discussion, see also 16-18). 
 
Abnormal Processes within the Individual 
 
In general medicine the technological paradigm is applied to treat physical processes, 
wherein precise empirical evidence usually - although not always - provides doctors with 
logical grounds for a chosen intervention (e.g., as in the case of cancer, cardiac disease, or 
AIDS). However, this is not equally applicable for functional psychiatric diagnoses, for 
which no categorical, aetiological models have ever been documented. As observed in a 
paper published in the British Journal of Psychiatry, authored by 29 practicing psychiatrists: 
“We suggest that this paradigm has not served psychiatry well. Ignoring fundamental 
epistemological issues at the heart of our models does not make them go away. Moreover, it 
does not yield results that are consistent with the demands of evidence-based 
medicine.”14 p.430-431  
For example, in contrast to continuing innovations in other medical disciplines, no 
mechanistically novel psychiatric drug has been marketed in over three decades; a situation 
largely explicable through a continuing lack of knowledge about the pathophysiology of 
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mental health problems.19 It is further notable that the major classes of psychotropic agents 
(antipsychotics, antidepressants, anxiolytics) were discovered on the basis of chance clinical 
observation rather than targeted development (e.g., preclinical or genetic data, disease 
pathophysiology drawn from animal models), and thus do not meet the criteria for modern 
drug discovery methods.19 In turn, the most popular and prevailing locus for mental health 
problems, that of the ‘chemical imbalance,’ is largely attributable to the modes of action of 
these drugs (e.g., the discovery that antipsychotic compounds block D2 receptors is the basis 
of the ‘dopamine theory of schizophrenia’ which claims hallucinations and delusions are 
caused by hyperactive signal transduction in the dopaminergic system). However, as noted by 
Jackson,20 this is essentially a model in which a condition has been hypothesized to account 
for a drug mechanism, rather than designing a drug to treat a specific disorder. As Kendall, 
writing in The British Journal of Psychiatry, describes it: “the story of the atypicals and the 
SGAs [second-generation antipsychotics] is not the story of clinical discovery and progress; it 
is the story of fabricated classes, money and marketing.” 21,p.266-267  
 In an absence of identifiable biomarkers, psychiatry relies on a system of symptom-
based diagnosis and treatment that Thomas Insel,4 the director of the National Institute of 
Mental Health (NIMH), has likened to “creating diagnostic systems based on the nature of 
chest pain or the quality of fever”, additionally noting that symptom-based diagnoses are 
increasingly rare in other medical disciplines because they rarely designate the most suitable 
intervention. The pervasive problems with the reliability of psychiatric classification is well-
documented,22 and is probably best typified in clinical practice by the familiar sight of 
patients with numerous conflicting diagnostic labels. Indeed, in response to the publication of 
the 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), NIMH 
issued a statement of intent to re-orientate its research away from DSM classifications in 
favour of assembling genetic, imaging, physiologic, and cognitive data (whilst also 
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acknowledging that sufficient information does not currently exist to develop such a 
system).4 
 Taken together the technological paradigm reflects a tendency towards medicalizing 
and pathologizing human experience,14 despite an absence of adequate empirical data to 
justify this approach. This is a type of reductionism famously and powerfully critiqued since 
the 1960s in the work of the ‘anti-psychiatrists’ Laing and Szasz, although more recent 
critiques were apparent following the publication of DSM-5, including an international 
statement of concern23 as well as grave reservations from the Chair of the DSM-IV 
taskforce.24 In a related point, Bracken et al.14 also note how the assumptions of the 
technological paradigm have made psychiatry vulnerable to corruption through its close 
alliances with the pharmaceutical industry, which in turn risks undermining trust and integrity 
in the profession.  
This is not to deny that some individuals with mental health difficulties evince a series 
of detectable neurophysiological changes. Nor is it to suggest that neuroscience has no role in 
advancing understanding of the causes of, and effective treatments for, mental health 
problems. However, as will be discussed below, a key issue is considering these changes 
within their appropriate context. 
 
Abnormal Processes are Independent of Context  
 
According to the technological paradigm, mental illness can be modelled in universal causal 
terms independently of individual circumstances.14 This can be seen in the emphasis of faulty 
biological mechanisms discussed above, as well as the discipline of ‘descriptive 
psychopathology,’ a phenomenological tradition that accentuates the form of psychiatric 
symptoms rather than their subjective content. In fact, evidence in the last decade has 
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demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that mental health problems are associated with a 
broad range of adverse contexts, particularly (but by no means exclusively) childhood 
adversities. For example, the WHO World Mental Health Survey (n=51,945) reported strong 
associations between childhood maltreatment and first onset of 20 DSM-IV disorders,25 with 
childhood abuse additionally increasing the likelihood of greater clinical severity (e.g., self-
harm and suicidality, hospitalisation frequency and duration, medication dosage, global 
symptom burden26). It is important to emphasise that such associations also extend to 
psychotic experience, despite its long-standing status as a primarily biogenetic condition, and 
which are not only dose-dependent but remain significant when controlling for a broad range 
of confounding clinical and demographic variables (for review see27-29). In turn, psychotic 
symptoms have been found in some cases to be thematically congruent with previous 
experiences of adversity,30-32 such as hearing the voice of a perpetrator. Indeed, seeking 
intelligible links between adverse life events and the content of psychotic symptoms is a 
therapeutic aspect emphasised during psychological formulation, on the grounds that “[s]uch 
links often provide indications of long-standing unresolved difficulties and associated 
negative self-evaluations…which may be closely intertwined with processes maintaining 
delusional beliefs and voices and may underpin aspects of the emotional reaction” 33,p.127 (see 
also 34-35). 
 Give the substantial evidence for the impact of adversity on the brain,36-38 the 
technological paradigm’s essentialist framework - that neurological and biochemical 
abnormalities observed in adult patients have a causal etiological status independent of 
psychosocial circumstances – must clearly be called into question. An example of a contrary 
approach is the Traumagenic Neurodevelopmental (TN) model of psychosis,39-40 which 
outlines the reciprocal interactions between environmental stressors and cognitive, affective 
and biological elements in the individual. By demonstrating the profound similarities between 
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functional/structural abnormalities in the brains of abused children and those of adult 
psychosis patients (which in turn correspond to differences between psychotic patients and 
healthy adults, and traumatized and non-traumatized children) the TN demonstrates that 
adverse events cannot reasonably be minimized to ‘triggers’ for a genetic predisposition, but 
should be considered as causal events in and of themselves. In terms of the technological 
paradigm it is interestingly placed, because while it conforms to assumptions that mental 
health problems arise from disordered processes that can be modelled in causal terms, it also 
locates these processes in the psychosocial context in which they arise. This is a crucial 
difference, for while the TN model is empirically supported,40 it is also able to highlight how 
positivistic approaches have the capacity to decontextualize misery and mental distress.  
 
Instrumental Interventions  
 
Technological approaches to psychiatric care prioritize instrumental interventions that 
supposedly address explicit disorders, with factors like narrative, subjective meaning, and 
interpersonal relationships often minimized,14 or even dismissed entirely.41 This is evident in 
the case of pharmacotherapy, but also in some forms of cognitive therapy, and is a framework 
that Radden42 likens to ‘a repair manual’ of mental health. In turn, Thomas and Longden17 
argue that such models have prioritized empiricism in a way that stifles the caring impulse; 
and as such are fundamentally incapable of engaging with human suffering in a principled 
way.  
Whilst not denying that some patients find pharmacotherapy helpful, it is important to 
acknowledge the lack of evidence for the capacity of psychiatric drugs to successfully target 
and remedy a hypothetical ‘chemical imbalance,’43 as well as findings that pharmacology has 
only a partial influence on ameliorating complex mental health difficulties. 5,44-46 
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Furthermore, many benefits associated with mental health treatments are robustly attributable 
to non-technical aspects.14 For example the placebo effect – a complex phenomenon linked to 
non-specific factors like hope, positive expectancy, and personal meaning – is known to have 
an impact in trials of antidepressants,47-48 antipsychotics49 and ECT.50 Likewise the nature of 
the therapeutic alliance can often be a better predictor of outcome than the specific, technical 
properties of a given therapy – a phenomenon known as ‘the equivalence paradox.’ For 
example, a comparison of 5,613 cases involving cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), 
person-centred, or psychodynamic therapy over three years found that the therapeutic alliance 
accounted for the largest proportion of variance in clinical outcomes, with no specific 
technique emerging as superior.51 
Other non-specific factors suggested to influence psychotherapy outcomes include 
individual client factors, such as resilience, self-esteem and coping skills,52 and extra-
therapeutic events,53 although it is the therapeutic relationship that tends to show the strongest 
associations. For example, a recent RCT of 308 patients treated for acute psychosis has 
demonstrated that the quality of the therapeutic alliance in both CBT and supportive 
counselling has a causal effect on symptom outcome, with poor relationships being actively 
detrimental.54 Factors deemed particularly important include cooperation, collaboration, 
empathy, and responsiveness,55 although these are not limited to psychotherapy; a good 
relationship with one’s prescriber is likewise associated with better outcomes in drug 
treatment.56-58 However, the benefit of compassionate interactions that nurture a sense of 
confidence, connection and autonomy is by no means a new discovery; its value was 
recognized as early as the 18th century in the concept of ‘moral therapy,’ a humane (albeit 
paternalistic) alternative for the care of asylum inmates. Historians generally agree that the 
promotion of ‘kindness, dignity, and decency’ enjoyed striking success in a pre-
pharmaceutical and pre-therapy age. For example, from 1833-1853 the Worcester State 
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Hospital in the United States discharged 71% of first-episode patients as ‘cured,’ with rates of 
59% for those with longer pre-admission disturbance, and only a minority identified as 
chronically ill.59 
 
Moving Forwards: Models of Psychosocial Care 
 
Taken together, a growing body of evidence refutes the idea that a ‘technical idiom’14 is a 
suitable way to approach CC delivery. Indeed, as discussed, there is reason to believe that the 
primacy of technological paradigms may actually hinder recovery for some service-users. 
Dillon60 summarizes this paradox  in the following way: that one’s 1) emotional crisis (a 
supposed biogenetic abnormality) is responded to with 2) denial (the emotional meaning of 
experiences like voice hearing or unusual beliefs are ignored and the role of painful life 
events disregarded), which is followed by 3) insight (the patient accepts their biological 
illness), followed by 4) ‘recovery’ (symptoms are controlled by medication), and which 
finally results in 5) relapse (the initial crisis continues to reoccur, for in addition to the 
person’s underlying, unresolved emotional problems, they may also face stigma, exclusion, 
medication side-effects, and a sense of hopelessness). Thus a cycle of maintenance and 
chronicity may become established.  
Nevertheless, despite limited scientific evidence to justify it, substantial accounts of 
the harm it can cause, and extensive evidence for the role of psychosocial factors in mental 
distress, technological approaches to psychiatric care continue to endure. There are numerous 
influences that contribute to sustaining this dominance. While a full account is beyond the 
scope of the current article, they include (but are not limited) to the following factors, 
summarized thus by Rapley et al.: “The medicalization of suffering and difference thrives 
because it sanitizes and simplifies.”61,p.4  
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1. Political interest. It is politically convenient for policy makers to emphasize 
individual biology in ways that decontextualize mental health problems and thus 
deflect scrutiny from damaging social systems. Childhood abuse and neglect, 
adulthood assault, poverty, and discrimination have devastating personal 
consequences, yet medicalizing subsequent distress permits a level of denial and 
distancing that absolves those in power of responsibility for addressing injustice and 
instituting legislative change. 
2. Economic interest. The influence of the pharmaceutical industry on psychiatric 
practice, training, and clinical research has attracted sustained concern and criticism.62 
Nevertheless, financial motives for perpetuating biological models of mental distress 
are considerable, and may be one of the most powerful barriers to change. For 
example, in the United States alone sales of psychiatric medications generated $25 
billion in 201163 (for comparison, the net income for the Google corporation in 2012 
was $10.74 billion). 
3. Professional interest.  Constructing a clinical problem (whether in terms of disrupted 
biological systems or dysfunctional psychological mechanisms) promotes the need for 
specialist, scientific expertise. As such, many aspects of the ‘Psych’ professions are 
premised on emphasizing problems within the individual as the main target for 
intervention, wherein contextualizing mental health problems and acknowledging 
damaging social/political realities presents profound challenges to the legitimacy of 
its “self-defined subject matter.” 64,p.37   
4. Interpersonal interest. Some families may have a vested interest in conceptualizing 
their relatives’ difficulties as an illness rather than the result of damaging life events. 
However, with the exception of caregivers who deliberately inflict cruelty or neglect, 
locating the origins of distress within the family of origin should not be seen as a 
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blaming impulse. Conversely, recognizing the impact of poverty, attachment 
disturbances, social conflict, and intergenerational trauma can help to acknowledge 
and address the needs of both patients and their families in more restorative ways.65  
5. Individual  interest. The process of societal/political denial and distancing also 
operates on an individual level. Emphasizing a categorically different group 
characterized by fundamental biological/genetic abnormalities drives the reciprocal 
mechanisms of fear, avoidance, and scapegoating which, in turn, exaggerates the 
differences between ‘the mad’ and ‘the sane’ and denies the dimensionality of 
emotional distress. On one hand, this protects our need to see ourselves as different 
from ‘the mentally ill’, but is also a way to avoid contemplating the need to address 
violence and injustice within one’s society. In turn, patients may also internalize 
medical paradigms, either to protect themselves or their families from painful 
realities, or to devolve responsibility for ‘cure’ to mental health services in an 
unconscious attempt to meet a need for caring input that may have previously been 
withheld (e.g., during childhood). 
 
Taken together, there are clearly considerable influences that contribute to 
maintaining a status quo, both in CC and approaches to mental health more generally. Is there 
any cause for optimism about the feasibility of a paradigm shift?  
Although the progression towards more psychosocially responsible services is 
protracted and slow, there are still grounds to note important developments in recent years. 
Firstly, this includes a notable growth in academic interest for psychosocial approaches to 
complex mental health difficulties (e.g., the number of research articles considering links 
between schizophrenia and trauma has more than doubled in the past ten years compared to 
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the previous decadei). Whilst the lengthy interval between research findings and practical 
implementation is well recognized in applied disciplines, there is nevertheless growing 
indication that these ideas are beginning to be partially fulfilled at a service level. In the UK, 
for example, National Health Service guidelines advocate asking all psychiatric service-users 
about trauma exposure;66 and the British Psychological Society’s Division of Clinical 
Psychology has emphasized the utility of psychotherapeutic approaches to so-called 
pathognomonic symptoms of schizophrenia, like voice hearing and delusions.35 Whilst such 
frameworks do not yet constitute standard practice, Boyle64,p.30 makes the important 
observation that “the evidence causally linking social context to distress…is plentiful and 
robust, so that there is a limit to how far clinical psychology and psychiatry can avoid it 
without raising questions about their status as evidence based disciplines.” 
There are also many signs of growing unity and fellowship between groups of 
individuals wishing to promote non-technical paradigms to mental distress. This includes 
influential survivor-led organizations, such as the Hearing Voices Movement 
(intervoiceonline.org), Mind Freedom International (mindfreedom.org), and Mad in America 
(madinamerica.com), in which coalitions of survivors and their allies critique reductionist 
approaches to mental wellbeing, and raise awareness of the perceived abuses and violations 
associated with them. Professional bodies like the Critical Psychiatry Network 
(criticalpsychiatry.net) and the International Society for Psychological and Social Approaches 
to Psychosis (isps.org) likewise advocate for progressive reform within the mental health 
system. In turn, research shows that members of the public across the world (with the general 
exception of the United States) show a consistent preference for psychosocial explanations 
and treatments for mental distress over technical, biomedical ones.67  
i Based on a Scopus search (schizophrenia AND trauma OR abuse): 5,304 articles published 
between 2004 and 2014; 2,166 published between 1993 and 2003 
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 Testimony from those with lived experience of mental health problems has also 
successfully highlighted the inadequacy of technological models for understanding the 
nuances of distress and recovery. For example, contrary to a clinical focus on symptom 
cessation, the concept of ‘personal recovery’ emphasizes factors like connectedness, hope, 
identity, meaning in life, and empowerment68 – factors which can, and do, occur outside of 
the mental health system. In turn, survivor-led recovery literature challenges assumptions that 
the impact of mental health crises are inevitably and exclusively negative which, whilst not 
negating the fear and pain many patients experience, emphasise how experiences of mental 
distress, including psychosis, “have ultimately informed and augmented…wellbeing (e.g. 
through a heightened capacity for political engagement, creativity, compassion, fortitude, and 
self-knowledge).”69, p.25 There is also the knowledge that clinical, technologically-led 
treatments are only one of several possible routes to recovery,68 as well as the recognized fact 
that people with diagnosable mental health problems may often live successfully outside of 
psychiatry (e.g., they are not distressed by their experiences/actively value them; or they have 
a non-medical or non-psychological framework, such as spiritual or cultural beliefs). Taken 
together, these are diversities and complexities that purely technological paradigms are 
unable to successfully accommodate. 
As Bracken et al.14,p.432-433 express it, “The evidence base is telling us that we need a 
radical shift in our understanding of what is at the heart (and perhaps soul) of mental health 
practice...good psychiatry involves active engagement with the complex nature of mental 
health problems, a healthy scepticism for biological reductionism, tolerance for the tangled 
nature of relationships and meanings and the ability to negotiate these issues in a way that 
empowers service users and their carers.” In this respect there are several examples of 
holistic, sociocentric services that demonstrate the feasibility of working outside a 
technological paradigm. These include the Sanctuary Model,70 the Soteria paradigm,71 and 
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Open Dialogue family and network approach,72 all of which are configured at organisational 
and clinical levels to promote psychological growth and reconstitution, and which broadly 
emphasize communal, social, and dialogical processes with minimal medication use. 
Furthermore, while options for patients and professionals enmeshed in more conventional 
services can appear limited, there are still avenues for facilitating and promoting positive 
change. Examples of potential strategies are presented in Table 1. 
 
- Table 1 here - 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article began with an account of the beleaguered status of modern psychiatry and, by 
extension, the models of CC over which it presides. In turn, we have outlined some of the 
major theoretical and practical weaknesses of its associated technological paradigm, as well 
as indications of – and practical suggestions for – the institution of paradigm change. Taken 
together, this type of discontent supports the contention that a conceptual shift in mental 
health is not only necessary, but also feasible, and inevitable. In doing so, we do not suggest 
that empiricism has no place in mental healthcare, or that biomedical theory and practice 
have no benefit. However, as we have outlined, there is also evidence that a radical 
reappraisal is needed of how these factors are currently applied within CC. 
In a paper considering the historical links between schizophrenia, trauma, and 
dissociation, the psychologist Andrew Moskowitz73, p.351 applies the reasoning of the 
philosopher Thomas Kuhn to this very question. According to this perspective, intellectual 
and practical changes occur when incongruities and contradictions undermine the basic 
hypotheses upon which the ‘old rules’ of a particular discipline were established. The 
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ultimate outcome is conceptual revolution, and a shift from ‘ordinary to extraordinary’ in 
research, theory, and practice: 
 
Kuhn (1970) argued that paradigms change and a scientific revolution 
ensues when three conditions are met: (a) a period of crisis develops 
in which the paradigm fails to adequately answer questions considered 
fundamental; serious ‘anomalies’ occur in which phenomena not 
clearly compatible with the paradigm are observed; and, importantly, 
(c) a suitable alternative paradigm that explains many of the previous 
findings and at least some of the observed anomalies comes to light. 
Kuhn saw scientific revolutions as taking time to resolve; he argued 
that changing such strongly held beliefs involved a process of 
persuasion and fundamental reorganization not unlike that of religious 
conversion: ‘Conversions will occur a few at a time until, after the last 
holdouts have died, the whole profession will again be practicing 
under a single, now different paradigm (Kuhn, 1970, p.152).  
 
In a recent paper asking the question ‘How much evidence is required for a paradigm 
shift in mental health?’41, p.477 two authors of the current paper also invoked Kuhn’s work: 
 
As Kuhn pointed out, an accumulation of evidence contradicting a 
long-standing paradigm is not sufficient, because the ‘last holdouts’ 
have a myriad of strategies to minimize, distort and deny the new 
evidence. He referred to the need for less ‘scientific’ processes such as 
enthusiasm and persuasion. Perhaps the most exciting, and persuasive, 
recent development has been the rapid development of the Hearing 
Voices movement (www.intervoiceonline.org). Many voice hearers all 
over the world, tired of waiting for the paradigm shift that the research 
evidence demands, are supporting one another and training mental 
health professionals how to help when asked. 
 
The closing of the old hospital asylums, and the accompanying move to CC, had the 
potential to facilitate genuine change. Yet the hospitals, although smaller, still remain the 
lynchpin of services. And beyond the hospital, the medical model and its decontextualized 
technologies still dominate, along with the constant threat of compulsory treatment. Growing 
doubt and dissatisfaction around these technological approaches to mental health are, 
however, fuelling the search for more suitable models with which to theorise and respond to 
human distress. The challenge for the next generation of practitioners is to extend beyond 
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reductionist biological models and acknowledge the complex influence of psychosocial, 
political, relational, and cultural components in which mental health problems are inevitably 
embedded, and then to develop treatments and supports that address those real causes of 
human distress. It is both as straightforward – and as complex – as that. 
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Table 1.  Practical strategies for facilitating a paradigm shift in mental health care. 
 
 
Individual level 
 
Inquiring about service users’ lives and how they think adversity  
        exposure may have impacted on their current difficulties. 
Asking service-users what they need and what type of support they feel  
        would be most helpful. 
Encouraging colleagues to focus on recovery rather than pathology. 
Forming alliances with progressive professional organizations, and 
groups  
        of families and service users. 
Avoiding language that is stigmatizing (e.g., ‘schizophrenic’) or  
        pathologizing (e.g., ‘illness’). 
Lobbying for change to local and national government, mental health  
        service managers, and in social and corporate media. 
 
Service/provider 
level 
 
Active involvement of service users in the design, management and  
        evaluation of services. 
Facilitating service user-led training and research. 
Refusing to accept money from the pharmaceutical industry. 
Supporting psychiatrists to share the responsibility for risk management. 
Initiating or supporting relevant psychosocially-focused training. 
 
Societal level 
 
Advocating for reduced coercion and involuntary treatment in services 
        and legislation. 
29 
 
Advocating for primary prevention (e.g., child protection; domestic  
        violence services; anti-bullying policies). 
Publically emphasizing the psychological consequences of 
victimization,  
        inequality, discrimination and other forms of injustice. 
Drawing attention to attempts by the pharmaceutical industry to 
influence  
        mental health policy, research, and service provision. 
 
Note.  Adapted from “Creating evidence-based, effective and human mental health services: 
overcoming barriers to a paradigm shift,” by J. Read and J. Dillon, 2013, in Models of 
madness: psychological, social, and biological approaches to psychosis (eds. J Read, J 
Dillon): 392-407. London: Routledge. 
 
 
 
 
